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Abstract
We study the contribution of market regulations in the dynamics
of the real exchange rate within the European Union. Based on a
model proposed by De Gregorio et al. (1994a), we show that both
product market regulations in nontradable sectors and employment
protection tend to inflate the real exchange rate. We then carry out
an econometric estimation for European countries over 1985-2006 to
quantify the contributions of the pure Balassa-Samuelson effect and
those of market regulations in real exchange-rate variations. Based on
this evidence and on a counter-factual experiment, we conclude that
the relative evolution of product market regulations and employment
protection across countries play a very significant role in real exchange-
rate variations within the European Union and especially within the
Euro area, through theirs impacts on the relative price of nontradable
goods.
Keywords: Real exchange rate, Balassa-Samuelson effect, Product
market regulations, Employment protection
JEL classification: F41, J50, L40.
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1 Introduction
One key feature of the sovereign debt crisis that hit several countries of
the Euro area in 2008 and following years was a sudden stop of private
capital inflows, which had to be taken over by official financings (Member
states, European Financial Stability Facility, International Monetary Fund),
and by the intra-Euro area payment system (TARGET2).1 Indeed, crisis
countries generally displayed twin deficits, i.e. a fiscal deficit and a current
account deficit. Unlike Japan, these countries were unable to rely on domestic
private savings to refinance their government debt, making them vulnerable
to a sudden stop in external financing.2 The policy debate then pointed
price divergence within the Euro area as one major cause of the crisis. As
evidenced in Figure 1, from 1999 to 2008, the consumer price index increased
by 17% in Germany against 36% in Greece and Ireland, 34% in Spain, 30%
in Portugal and 25% in Italy. Such price divergence would not have been
worrisome should it have corresponded to a catch-up process, consistent with
the Balassa-Samuelson effect (BS effect, hereafter, see Balassa (1964) and
Samuelson (1964)).3 In 1999, however, Ireland had already caught up with
Germany in terms of GDP per capita. In the other countries, although part
of the price divergence observed during the decade may be explained by the
BS effect, the extent of the drift calls for alternative explanations.
The consumer price index covers both tradable and nontradable goods.
Excess price increase in tradable sectors impacts price competitiveness vis-
a`-vis foreign competitors, with a negative, demand-side effect on exports.
In turn, excess price increase in nontradable sectors acts as an incentive to
transfer resources from the tradable sectors to the nontradable ones, with a
negative, supply-side effect on exports. This latter effect is often overcome
by international trade analyses that tend to focus on the relative price of
tradables across countries rather than their relative price compared to non-
tradables. Still, the bulk of price divergences observed between 1999 and
2006 within the Euro area seems to be attributable to nontradable sectors,
as evidenced in Figure 2. This suggests that the supply-side effect may have
been a significant driver of current account deficits over the period.
The question then is how to explain such divergences in nontradable prices
beyond the BS effect. We argue that the relaxation of the assumption of per-
1See, eg., Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012).
2See Gros (2011).
3The BS effect states that, assuming the law of one price holds for tradable goods,
productivity growth in this sector pushes real wages up both in the tradable sector and
(through labor mobility) in the nontradable one. This results in an increase in the relative
price of nontradables and thus in a real exchange-rate appreciation.
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Figure 1: Harmonized consumer price index in Euro area countries, 1999-
2011(1999=100)
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fect competition in this sector - a key assumption of the BS model - can go a
long way in explaining price divergences within the Euro area. Specifically,
changes in product and labor market regulations are found able to magnify
or offset the Balassa-Samuelson effect along the catching-up process. We
construct a theoretical model that incorporates imperfect competition and
employment protection in the classic BS framework. Our theoretical model
predicts that market power in the nontradable sector and employment pro-
tection both affect the real exchange rate. Reduced competition in the non-
tradable sector or higher employment protection cause an appreciation of the
real exchange rate. Based on econometric estimations for twelve European
countries over 1985-2006, we finally quantify the contributions of the pure BS
effect and those of product market regulations and employment protection
in real exchange-rate variations. Through a counter-factual analysis, we find
that, should product market regulations and employment protection have
gradually converged to German levels over 1995-2006, the real exchange-rate
appreciation observed in Mediterranean countries such as Greece, Portugal
and Italy, would have been muted.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly
surveys the literature on the BS effect. In Section 3, we present the theoret-
3
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Figure 2: Consumer price index in Euro area countries, tradables versus
nontradables, 1999-2006 (1999=100)
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ical framework based on De Gregorio et al. (1994a). The data used in the
estimations are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the econometric
strategy and reports the empirical estimation results. Section 6 presents a
counter-factual exercise. Section 7 concludes.
2 A brief overview of the literature
The workhorse model for studying the evolution of nontradable prices in
an open economy is the Balassa-Samuelson framework proposed by Balassa
(1964) and Samuelson (1964). The original model features a small open
economy producing two goods: a tradable good whose price is set at the
international level (law of one price), and a nontradable one whose price
is set at the country level, under perfect competition. Labour is the only
production factor. It is assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors but
immobile internationally. In this setting, a rise in labour productivity in the
tradable sector triggers a rise in wages in both the tradable and the nontrad-
able sector. The latter, which does not benefit from the productivity gain,
experiences a rise in its unit labour cost, which is accommodated through a
price increase. On the whole, a productivity increase in the tradable sector
leads to a real exchange-rate appreciation through the increase of the relative
price of the nontradable good. This is the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
Several theoretical extensions of the BS setting have been proposed in
the literature.4 Asea and Corden (1994), Asea and Mendoza (1994) and
Turnovsky and Sen (1995) study the BS effect within a model with two
production factors: labour and capital. Asea and Corden (1994) and Asea
and Mendoza (1994) examine the implications of incorporating a demand
side in the BS framework. These theoretical extensions corroborate that
productivity differentials are at the root of relative price variations between
tradable and nontradable goods, hence also between home and foreign goods.
Turnovsky and Sen (1995) study the impact of demand shocks depending on
relative sectoral capital intensities. Specifically, when the tradable sector
is relatively intensive in nontradable capital, demand shocks cannot impact
the real exchange rate; when the nontradable sector is relatively intensive in
nontradable capital, demand shocks have only a transitory effect on the real
exchange rate. In all cases, demand shocks appear unable to move the real
exchange rate in the long run.
De Gregorio et al. (1994a) propose a two-sector, small open economy
model in which nontradable goods are produced by monopolistically com-
petitive firms and wages are determined by a centralized labor union. In this
4See Bahmani-Oskooee and Nasir (2005) for a review.
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model, shocks to productivity, consumer tastes, government expenditures
and the price of tradables affect labor demand, wages and consequently the
relative price of nontradables goods. More recently, Sheng and Xu (2011)
extend the BS model to an environment with search unemployment. They
show that matching efficiency influences the relationship between the relative
price of nontradables and sectoral productivity: with limited labor market
frictions, search unemployment is high and the BS hypothesis is violated.
Both extentions of the BS model however assume market imperfections to
be constant over time.
On the empirical side, there is a large literature that can be grouped
into three strands. The first group consists of cross-sectional studies that
generally show evidence of BS effect. The pioneer paper of Balassa (1964)
falls in this group. Using data from twelve OECD countries, Balassa (1964)
shows that countries with higher productivity in the tradable sector compared
with the nontradable sector tend to diplay higher price levels. Subsequent
papers such as Kravis and Lipsey (1983), Clague (1986, 1988) and Rogoff
(1992) have confirmed this result, also based on cross-section data.
The second group of empirical studies relies on time-series data on a
country-by-country basis. They generally support the BS effect (see Hsieh,
1982; Bahmani-Oskooee, 1992; Rogoff, 1992; Strauss, 1995, 1996).
The last group uses panel data techniques and also finds empirical evi-
dence in favor of the BS hypothesis (see, e.g. Asea and Mendoza (1994), De
Gregorio et al. (1994a,b), Strauss (1999), Bahmani-Oskooee and Nasir (2001)
and Egert et al. (2003)). The empirical study in Sheng and Xu (2011) also
falls in this last category. It provides empirical evidence of the relationship
between sectoral productivity and the real exchange rate being influenced by
labor market frictions.
Here we use the model of De Gregorio et al. (1994a), i.e. a BS model with
monopolistic competition in the nontradable sector.5 Unlike De Gregorio et
al. (1994a), however, we focus on variations in competition in the nontradable
sector and changes in labor market friction as key drivers of the real exchange
rate.
3 Theoretical framework
The economy is inhabited by a large number of identical households that live
two periods. There are two goods in the economy: a tradable good denoted
by T, and a nontradable one denoted by N. The tradable good is supplied
5We simplify the model by omitting government expenditures, the impact of which has
been shown either neutral or ambiguous in the literature, see De Gregorio et al. (1994b).
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on an international, perfectly competitive market. As for the nontradable
good, it is supplied on the local, imperfectly competitive market. Namely,
we assume regulations in the nontradable sector to maintain a markup over
the marginal price in this sector. Labour is the only production factor. The
wage rate is set by a centralized bargaining arrangement between employers
of the two sectors and trade unions.
3.1 Household
The representative household is assumed to maximize the following expected
utility function:
Max
{cTt ,cNt }t=1,2
log
[(
cT1
)γ (
cN1
)1−γ]
+ βlog
[(
cT2
)γ (
cN2
)1−γ]
(1)
subject to the following budget constraint:
pT1 c
T
1 + p
N
1 c
N
1 +
pT2
1 + r
cT2 +
pN2
1 + r
cN2 = Y (2)
where cTt and c
N
t denote the consumption of the tradable and nontradable
good, respectively, in period t (t = 1, 2), pTt , p
N
t their respective prices,
γ ∈ [0, 1] the share of the tradable good in household’s total expenditure at
each period, β > 0 the subjective discount factor, r the interest rate and
Y the intertemporal income. The budget constraint (2) implicitly assumes
that there is no initial wealth (at the beginning of period 1) nor bequest (at
the end of period 2). The intertemporal income is the discounted value of
production in both sectors at both dates, yTt and y
N
t :
Y = pT1 y
T
1 + p
N
1 y
N
1 +
pT2
1 + r
yT2 +
pN2
1 + r
yN2 (3)
The tradable good is assumed non-differentiated. Its price is set at the in-
ternational level. In contrast, the nontradable good consists of differentiated
varieties j, each being produced by a different monopolistically-competitive
local firm. There is a continuum of such firms of measure 1. Denoting by
cNt (j) the consumption of the nontradable variety j in period t, the compos-
ite consumption of the nontradable good is cNt =
(∫ 1
0
cNt (j)
θ−1
θ dj
) θ
θ−1
, where
θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between nontradable varieties.
The solution of the household maximization program yields the following
optimal intertemporal and intratemporal allocations:
7
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cT2
cT1
= β(1 + r)
pT1
pT2
(4)
cTt
cNt
=
γ
1− γ
pNt
pTt
for t = 1, 2 (5)
Equation (4) represents the Euler condition. It implies that spending on
the tradable good (pT cT ) declines between period 1 and period 2 if β(1+r) <
1, increases in the opposite case and stays constant if β(1 + r) = 1. In turn,
Equation (5) provides the optimal intratemporal allocation between tradable
and nontradable goods. The distribution of the representative household’s
spending between the tradable and the nontradable good is constant over
time, determined by the preference parameter γ. Equations (4) and (5)
can finally be combined to recover the evolution of the consumption of the
nontradable good between the two periods.
Combining equations (2) to (5), and remembering that by definition cNt =
yNt for t = 1, 2, the intertemporal income can be rewritten in terms of tradable
goods output as follows:
Y =
1
γ
[
pT1 y
T
1 +
1
1 + r
pT2 y
T
2
]
=
Y T
γ
where Y T = pT1 y
T
1 +
1
1 + r
pT2 y
T
2 (6)
Denoting by Ct total spending (of both goods) in period t, the optimum
spending in each period is:
C1 =
Y
1 + β
=
Y T
γ(1 + β)
(7)
C2 =
β(1 + r)Y
1 + β
=
β(1 + r)Y T
γ(1 + β)
(8)
The consumption of tradables (resp. nontradables) represents a fraction
γ (resp. (1− γ)) of total consumption spending:
cTt = γ
Ct
pTt
and cNt = (1− γ)
Ct
pNt
, t = 1, 2 (9)
Given the level of nontradable consumption, household’s demand for each
variety of nontradable good is:6
cN(j) =
(
pN(j)
pN
)
−θ
cN =
(1− γ)C
pN
(
pN(j)
pN
)
−θ
(10)
6Here we drop time subscripts for the sake of clarity.
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where
pN =
(∫ 1
0
pN(j)
1−θ
dj
) 1
1−θ
(11)
Since there is no initial stock of external assets, the current-account balance
in the first period is given by the excess supply of tradable goods:
ca1 = y
T
1 − c
T
1 =
β
1 + β
[
yT1 −
pT2
pT1
1
(1 + r)β
yT2
]
(12)
Therefore, if the price of tradable goods (determined exogenously) is fixed
over the two-periods, and if the utility discount rate equals the world interest
rate, the first period current-account is given by the difference in the level of
output of tradable goods in the two periods.
Finally, the consumer price index is pt =
(
pTt
)γ (
pNt
)1−γ
so that Ct =
ptct = p
T
t c
T + pNt c
N
t where ct = γ
−γ(1 − γ)−(1−γ)
(
cTt
)γ (
cNt
)1−γ
being the
aggregate consumption.
3.2 Firms
In both sectors, production uses labor as a single input. Labor is supplied in-
elastically by the representative household, but there is perfect labor mobility
across the two sectors, ensuring a single wage is set, W .
3.2.1 Tradable sector
Production of the tradable good is subject to decreasing returns to scale:
yT = aT (lT )α (13)
where aT is a technology, productivity-enhancing factor, lT denotes labor
in the tradable sector, and 0 < α < 1. The price of the tradable good is set
at international level. Profit maximization then yields:
αaT (lT )α−1 =
W
pT
(14)
Therefore, equilibrium output in the tradable sector is given by:
yT = (aT )1/(1−α)
(
αpT
W
)α/(1−α)
(15)
9
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3.2.2 Nontradable sector
In the nontradable sector, there is a continuum of individual producers under
monopolistic competition. We assume constant returns to scale for each
producer. The production of each variety is thus given by:
yN(j) = aN lN(j) (16)
where lN(j) denotes labor used to produce variety j, and aN represents
mean and marginal productivity, which is constant.
Each firm j maximizes its profit accounting for its own demand func-
tion subject to its technological constraint. At equilibrium, the demand for
each nontraded variety equals its production: yN(j) = cN(j). Hence, each
producer j has the following maximization program:
Max
lN (j)
pN(j)yN(j)−WlN(j) (17)
subject to yN(j) = aN lN and yN(j) =
(
pN (j)
pN
)
−θ
cN .
The solution of this program is:
pN(j) = pN =
θ
θ − 1
W
aN
= µ
W
aN
(18)
where µ = θ/(θ − 1) is the markup in the nontradable sector.
Given that pN(j) = pN , the equilibrium output of nontradable sector can
easily be recovered:
yN = cN =
(1− γ)Y T
γ(1 + β)pN
=
(1− γ)aNY T
γµ(1 + β)W
(19)
3.3 Labor union
Total labor demand is given by Ld = lT + lN . From Equation (14), we get
labour demand in the tradable sector:
lT =
(
αaTpT
W
)1/(1−α)
(20)
From equations (16) and (19) and since yN = (1/µ)aN lN , we get labour
demand in the nontradable sector:
lN =
∫ 1
0
lN(j)dj = µyN/aN =
(1− γ)Y T
γ(1 + β)W
(21)
10
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So, total labour demand is given by:
Ld = lT + lN =
(
αaTpT
W
)1/(1−α)
+
(1− γ)Y T
γ(1 + β)W
(22)
Denoting by w the consumption real wage (w = W/p), Equation (22) can
be re-written as follows:
Ld = lT + lN =
(
αaTpT
wp
)1/(1−α)
+
(1− γ)Y T
γ(1 + β)wp
(23)
Like De Gregorio et al. (1994a), we assume that the real wage w is deter-
mined by a centralized labor union. The objective of the union is to minimize
a quadratic loss function of the deviations of employment (L) and the real
wage (w) from their targets. This problem is:
Min
w
(L− L)2 + λ(w − w)2 (24)
subject to
L = Ld(w) (25)
where L and w are the employment and real wage targets, respectively, and
λ > 0 measures the relative weight given to wages (relative to employment)
by the union. It is assumed that the union only sets the real wage of the cur-
rent period, after observing current and anticipated values of productivities
and markups.
From Equation (23), it can be seen that labor demand Ld is nonlinear in
w. Following De Gregorio et al. (1994a), we use a linear first-order Taylor
approximation of Ld:7
Ld = L0(a
T
+
, aN
+
, pT
+
, µ
−
)− ǫw (26)
where aT , aN , pT and µ affect L0 with the same sign as they affect the labor
demand and ǫ > 0. This formulation is similar to De Gregorio et al. (1994a),
except for the markup µ that here is allowed to change.
The solution of union’s program yields the following equilibrium real
wage:
7The first-order Taylor approximation of (23) around w0 is given by L
d(w) = Ld(w0)+
(w−w0)∂L
d(w0)/∂w = L0+ǫw where ∂L
d(w)/∂w = 1(1−α)w
(
αaT pT
pw
)1/(1−α)
− (1−γ)Y
T
γ(1+β)pw2 ,
L0 = L
d(w0) − w0∂L
d(w0)/∂w and ǫ = −∂L
d(w0)/∂w. Like De Gregorio et al. (1994a),
we neglect here the effect of labor demand parameters on ǫ.
11
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w =
λ
λ+ ǫ2
w +
ǫ
λ+ ǫ2
(L0 − L) (27)
If the values of aT , aN , pT , µ, w and λ are the same in period 1 as in
period 2, then, at equilibrium, the real wage can be written as follows:
w = w(aT
+
, aN
+
, pT
+
, µ
−
, w
+
, λ
+
) (28)
A permanent rise in productivity in the tradable or in the nontradable sector
raises permanent income, hence labor demand and the real wage. A perma-
nent fall in the markup in the nontradable sector sector has the same impact
qualitatively as a rise in productivity. A rise in the price of the tradable
amounts to positive shock on terms-of-trade, increasing the permanent in-
come of households, hence the labor demand by the firms and the equilibrium
real wage. Finally, labor market frictions have a positive, direct impact on
the real wage set by the union. Note that both the target wage w and its
weight λ in the unions’ loss function (the relative power of insiders vis-a`-vis
outsiders and firms) interact in the determination of the real wage.
We now consider a change in the parameters determining the real wage
over time. Specifically, Equation (29) shows how the parameters of both
periods affect the real wage in period 1.
w1 = w(a
T
1
+
, aT2
+
, aN1
+
, aN2
+
, P T1
+
, P T2
+
, µ1
−
, µ2
−
, w1
+
, λ1
+
) (29)
For instance, an expected fall in the markup µ in period 2 raises the real
wage already in period 1. The reason is that a fall in µ2 increases permanent
income, hence labour demand in both periods. The rise in labor demand,
hence in the real wage, is more limited in period 1, where it is driven by a
demand effect, than on period 2, where firms in the nontradable sector do
experiment the reduced markup. As for labor market frictions, we follow the
literature in assuming that they do not affect wages through their impact on
the permanent income. This assumption ensures that reduced labor market
frictions have a negative impact on the real wage. Another implication is
that only current labor market frictions affect the real wage.
The nominal wage can be recovered by noting that W = wp:
W1 = w1p1 = w
1/γ
1 p
T
1
[
µ1
aN1
](1−γ)/γ
= W (aT1
+
, aT2
+
, aN1
−
, aN2
+
, pT1
+
, pT2
+
, µ1
+
, µ2
−
, w1
+
, λ1
+
)
(30)
A fall in µ (or a rise in aN) has opposite effect on the nominal wage of
period 1 depending on whether the shock occurs in period 1 or in period
12
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2. In the latter case, the demand for nontradables increases in period 1, for
a given supply. Hence the price of nontradables increases, and so does the
nominal wage (which increases more than prices). In the former case, the
rise in the demand for nontradables in period 1 is more limited than the rise
in the supply. The price of nontradables falls, and so does the nominal wage
(which falls by less than prices).
3.4 Balassa-Samuelson effect with a union and product
market regulations
As shown in the previous subsection, a permanent decrease in µ, w or λ
depresses the price of nontradables, hence triggers a real exchange rate de-
preciation. In turn, anticipating in period 1 a product market deregulation
in period 2 leads to a rise in the nontradable price in period 1. The real
exchange rate appreciates in period 1 and depreciates in period 2, when the
supply of nontradables rises. This dynamic effect is absent in the case of an
anticipated deregulation of the labor market.
Because it affects tradable output equally in the two periods, and since the
tradable price is fixed, a permanent deregulation of the nontradable sector in
period 1 has no impact on the current account (to the extent that the utility
discount rate equals the world interest rate): ca = β/(1 + β).
(
yT1 − y
T
2
)
).
However, an anticipated product market deregulation in period 2 has a neg-
ative impact on the current account in the first period and a positive one in
the second one, when tradable output actually increases.
We are now interested in the long-term relationship between deregulation
of product and labor markets and the real exchange rate. As argued above,
a deregulation of the nontradable sector depreciates the real exchange rate,
if not in the short run (when anounced), at least in the long run (when
implemented). As for the deregulation of the labor market, it has no impact
on the real exchange rate when anounced but depreciates the real exchange
rate in the long run (when implemented). Denoting foreign variables by an
F subscript, and assuming the same share of tradables γ for each country,
under the law of price for the tradable sector, the bilateral real exchange rate
between the home and the foreign country is given by:
RER =
p
pF
=
(
pT
pTF
)γ (
pN
pNF
)(1−γ)
=
(
pN
pNF
)(1−γ)
(31)
Assuming that the home and the foreign countries are identical except
for productivity and market regulations, we get:
13
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RER = RER

(aT
aTF
)
+
,
(
aN
aNF
)
−
,
(
µ
µF
)
+
,
(
w
wF
)
+
,
(
λ
λF
)
+

 (32)
Equation (32) encapsulates the traditional BS effect (first two terms).
Here, however, market power in the nontradable sector (µ) and union de-
mands in terms of real wages (λ, w) also affect the real exchange rate. Fol-
lowing Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we consider that anti-competition
regulations (such as price controls or vertical integration, see Conway et al.
(2006)) tend to reduce the elasticity of substitution θ, hence to increase the
markup µ. Our model does not explicitly account for firm entry, hence en-
try costs are not identified in the model. However, restrictions to entry can
also be thought to increase the elasticity of substitution, hence to reduce the
markup.
Assuming, as in the literature, that productivity grows faster in the trad-
able sector than in the nontradable one, the empirically testable model is
given by:
RER = RER

( GDP
GDPF
)
+
,
(
PMR
PMRF
)
+
,
(
EP
EPF
)
+

 (33)
GDP is the real GDP per capita. PMR stands for the product mar-
ket regulation index (µ). Finally, EP represents an index of employment
protection that refers to λ and w, where λ and w interact.
4 Data
We consider annual data for twelve European countries: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
and United Kingdom. These countries are selected based on data availability
to get a balanced panel. We focus on EU countries for two reasons. First,
the single market makes the law of one price more likely to apply in this
region than in any other in the world. Second, we want to use our framework
to shed some light in observed price divergences over the monetary-union
period. Data cover the period 1985-2006.
The product market regulations (PMR) index in the nontradable sector
is computed as a weighted average of product market regulations in indi-
vidual sectors, weights being given by the shares in aggregate nontradable
value-added. Data on sectoral regulations are collected from the OECD
(OECD, 2011). The latter converts qualitative features such as laws and
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regulations into quantitative indices. More specifically, the index measures
the “knock-on” effects (i.e. the costs) of anti-competitive regulations in se-
lected non-manufacturing sectors and in sectors of the economy that heavily
rely on non-manufacturing inputs (see Conway et al. (2006) for more details).
In line with previous studies (De Gregorio et al., 1994b), we consider the fol-
lowing sectors as tradable: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; Mining
and quarrying; Total manufacturing; Transport, storage and communication.
The following sectors are classified as nontradable: Electricity, gas and water
supply; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels and restaurants.
Data on sectoral value-added are taken from EUKLEMS database.
The employment protection index (EP) is also collected from the OECD.
It refers to all types of employment protection measures, whether grounded
primarily in legislation, court rulings, collectively bargaining conditions of
employment or customary practice (See Venn (2009)). Like the PMR index,
the EP index scales quantitatively information that is mostly qualitative.
The real exchange rate and the real GDP per capita are recovered from
the Penn World Table version 7.0 (PWT 7.0, Heston et al., 2011). Following
Frankel (2006) and Rodrik (2008), we use the Penn World Table comparative
prices as the real exchange rate. These comparative prices have the advan-
tages of being internationally comparable in level. As in Frankel (2006) and
Rodrik (2008), we use GDP per capita at 2005 constant prices as a measure
of productivity.
We need to select one country of the sample as “foreign”. We pick up
the largest country, namely Germany and relate all variables to the same
variables in Germany.8 This choice also fits the debate on relative price di-
vergences within the euro area since monetary unification. In the econometric
estimation, the choice of a reference country is neutral since all estimations
are performed in logarithms.
Figure 3 displays the dynamics of real exchange rates and real GDPs per
capita. This figure highlights the standard BS effect, i.e., real exchange rate
and real income are positively correlated, although the real exchange rate is
more volatile especially before European Monetary Unification (EMU) and
in the UK.
8Changing the reference country does not alter the main conclusion of our study, which
emphasizes the role of PMR, although the impact of EP apppears more fragile. The results
are available from the authors.
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Figure 3: Real exchange rate and real GDP per capita, relative to Germany
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Figure 4: Product market regulations (1985, 1995, 2006)
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
1985 1995 2006 1985 1995 2006 1985 1995 2006 1985 1995 2006
1985 1995 2006 1985 1995 2006 1985 1995 2006 1985 1995 2006
1985 1995 2006 1985 1995 2006 1985 1995 2006 1985 1995 2006
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland
France Germany Greece Ireland
Italy Portugal Spain United Kingdom
Source: OECD database and own calculations.
Figure 5: Employment protection (1985, 1995, 2006)
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Figure 6: Real exchange rates and market regulations, relative to Germany
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Figures 4 and 5 report PMR and EP indices in 1985, 1995 and 2006,
successively.9 In all the countries of the sample the PMR tends to decline
over time (Figure 4), albeit at different paces. The decline is relatively slow
in Greece, and delayed in Italy and France. In 2006, all countries but Ireland
display tighter regulations than Germany, and in most of them, the gap to
Germany has increased since the mid-1990s.
Conversely, not all countries display a downward trend for EP: EP in-
creases over time in France while it stays constant at a very low level in
Ireland and the UK (Figure 5). In 2006, Germany appears in a median
situation concerning EP.
Figure 6 compares the dynamics of the real exchange rate to those of
PMR and EP indices (relative to Germany). In most countries, the real
exchange rate seems positively correlated to both indices.
5 Econometric estimation
In this section, we intend to test our theoretical result that product market
regulations in the nontradable sector, together with employment protection,
impact the real exchange rate on the top of the traditional BS effect. More
specifically, we intend to estimate the long-term relationship (33) through
panel cointegration.
5.1 Panel unit root and cointegration tests
We first study the presence of unit roots in our series based on the panel unit
root tests proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS) and Pesaran (2007)
Cross-sectionally Augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF). The Pesaran CADF al-
lows to take account of the cross-sectional dependence since it is based on
Dickey-Fuller type regressions augmented with the cross-section averages of
lagged levels and first differences of the individual series. The results of these
tests are reported in Table 1. At conventional levels of significance, all series
are found non-stationary in level, but stationary in first differences (see Table
1).
We then test for cointegration between the variables using the approach
proposed by Westerlund (2007). Specifically, we test whether there exists
error correction for individual panel members or for the panel as a whole.
This approach is flexible as it allows for heterogeneous specifications of both
the long and short run parts of the error correction model, based on the
data. Furthermore, the Westerlund panel cointegration test accounts for
9Intermediate years are available but skipped here to save space.
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Table 1: Panel unit root tests
Variable Level First difference
IPS CADF IPS CADF
lnRERi 0.240 -2.193 -7.069 -3.089
(0.595) (0.674) (0.000) (0.000)
ln
(
GDPi
GDPGER
)
-0.991 -2.356 -4.232 -2.626
(0.161) (0.449) (0.000) (0.002)
ln
(
PMRi
PMRGER
)
1.218 -1.871 -9.865 -3.155
(0.888) (0.945) (0.000) (0.000)
ln
(
EPi
EPGER
)
0.192 -1.542 -12.069 -2.323
(0.576) (0.997) (0.000) (0.029)
Note: IPS denotesWt−bar of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003)
panel unit root test and CADF is Cross-sectionally Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test statistic of Pesaran (2007). The
two tests have the null hypothesis of a unit root. P-values
are in parenthesis. Country-specific intercept and time
trend were included in both tests. Source: Authors’ cal-
culations.
Table 2: Panel cointegration tests (Westerlund)
Test Stat. P-value
Gτ -2.339** 0.030
Gα -6.565** 0.040
Pτ -6.668* 0.055
Pα -5.735* 0.070
Notes: Null hypothesis of no-cointegration. P-
values are obtained from 1000 bootstrap replications.
*,**,*** denotes the significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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cross-section dependence since the robust critical values can be computed
through bootstrapping. The case for cross-section dependence is especially
compelling in our case where shocks to the German economy affect all indi-
vidual observations simultaneously.
The null hypothesis of Westerlund’s tests is the absence of cointegration.
The Gα and Gτ statistics test whether there exits cointegration for at least
one individual panel member. The Pα and Pτ statistics pool information over
all the individual panel members to test whether there exits cointegration for
the panel as a whole. As reported in Table 2, the four tests reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration at least at the 10 percent level. We conclude
that there is evidence of cointegration.
5.2 Long-run relationship
Regarding the estimation of the long-run relationship, two approches have
been proposed in the literature that both deal with serial correlation and the
endogeneity of the regressors. The first one is the Fulled Modified Ordinary
Least Squares (FMOLS) technique proposed by Phillips and Hansen (1990)
that provides optimal estimates of cointegrating regressions by modifying
least squares. The second technique, the Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares
(DOLS), provided by Saikkonen (1991) and Stock andWatson (1993) consists
in using the leads and lags of the differenced endogenous variables as regres-
sors. An extension to a panel framework was proposed by Pedroni (2001)
and Phillips and Moon (1999) for the FMOLS, and by Mark and Sul (2003),
for DOLS. In this paper, we use the panel DOLS proposed by Mark and
Sul (2003), since Kao and Chiang (2001) show that DOLS outperforms both
OLS and FMOLS estimators in estimating cointegrated panel regressions.
The empirical model corresponding to equation (33) is:
lnRERit = βln
(
GDP
GDPGER
)
it
+ φPMRln
(
PMR
PMRGER
)
it
+ φEP ln
(
EP
EPGER
)
it
(34)
+ui + λit + θt + ǫit
where GER stands for Germany, ui is a country-specific effect, λit is
country-specific time trend, and θt is a common-time effect that serves to
account for cross-sectional dependence.
The PDOLS procedure consists in estimating Equation (34) by instru-
mental variables using leads and lags of differenced endogenous variables as
instruments. By Monte Carlo experiments, Mark and Sul (2003) show that
the panel dynamic OLS provides much more precise estimates compared to
the corresponding single-equation counterparts even for a small number of
cross-sectional units.
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Table 3: Panel cointegration estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson effect with
market regulations
Dependent variable: lnRER
No common trend Common trend
ln
(
GDP
GDPGER
)
0.864*** 0.611*** 0.400*** 0.340***
(0.207) (0.115) (0.193) (0.118)
ln
(
PMR
PMRGER
)
0.510*** 0.656***
(0.161) (0.191)
ln
(
EP
EPGER
)
0.233*** 0.184***
(0.061) (0.071)
Note: Standard errors, written in parenthesis, are based on
Andrews and Monahan (1992) pre-whitening method. *** denotes
the significance at 1% level.
Table 3 reports the estimation of the BS effect with product market reg-
ulations and employment protection. For purpose of comparison to the stan-
dard BS effect, we also estimate the model without market regulations. For
robustness, a first estimation is implemented with individual fixed effects and
individual trends, while the second estimation adds a common trend with in-
dividual fixed effects and individual trends. The results in Table 3 show that
all the explanatory variables (real GDP per capita, product market regula-
tions index in the nontradable sector and employment protection index, all
being relative to Germany) have the expected sign and are significant at the
1% level. In particular, the results highlight the standard BS effect, i.e., an
increase in country differential GDP per capita leads to an appreciation of the
real exchange rate relative to Germay. The impact of a one-percent growth
differential ranges from a 0.34 to 0.86 percent relative exchange-rate appre-
ciation, depending on the specification.10 Interestingly, introducing market
regulations tends to depress the coefficient on the BS effect.
A rise in either the PMR or the EP index (relative to Germany) leads the
real exchange rate to appreciate, the effect being stronger for PMR than for
EP. Indeed, a one-percent increase in the PMR index (relative to Germany)
triggers a 0.51 to 0.66 percent price increase relative to Germany. As evi-
denced in Figure 4, the German PMR index fell by 24% from 1995 to 2006
but only by 12% in Greece over the same period. Hence the Greek PMR
10This range stays consistent with the basic BS framework with perfect competition,
where the coefficient on the BS effect is equal to the share of nontradables in the economy.
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Figure 7: Counterfactual analysis
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increased by 12% relative to Germany which, according to our estimation,
can explain a relative price increase of 6 to 8 percent.
In turn, a 1 percent increase in relative employment protection triggers
a 0.18 to 0.23 percent relative price increase. Looking back to Figure 5, we
see that between 1995 and 2006, the EP index fell by 31% in Germany and
by 22% in Greece, hence the Greek EP index increased by 11% relative to
Germany. According to our estimations, this can explain an additional 2 to
3 percent increase in the relative price of Greece. Adding up the effect of
the PMR and that of the EP index, we get a 10-12 percent real exchange
rate appreciation in Greece relative to Germany between 1995 and 2006,
hence a large part of the observed 25 percent appreciation. We conclude
that product and employment market regulations are far from anecdotal in
explaining relative price variations within the Euro area. The next section
proposes a counterfactual analysis to further measure the impact of these
regulations.
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6 Counterfactual analysis
To futher quantify the contributions of product and labor market regulations
in real exchange-rate variations, we now conduct a counterfactual analysis.
We consider a linear convergence of product and labor market regulations
to their corresponding levels of Germany from 1995 to 2006.The results are
displayed in Figure 7. For each country, the first bar reports the observed
variation in the real exchange between 1995 and 2006. The second one shows
the counterfactual variation in the real exchange rate under convergence of
market regulations. The third and fourth bars report the contribution of
PMR and EP, respectively, to the difference between the first two bars.
The charts in Figure 7 indicate that, under convergence of market reg-
ulations, real exchange appreciations observed in Greece, Italy and Spain
would have been much reduced, while the real exchange rate would have
even slightly depreciated (relative to Germany) in Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land, France and Portugal. On the contrary, in Denmark, Ireland and the
UK, the real exchange rate would have appreciated more under convergence.
In most countries, the main contribution in these counterfactual results is
the evolution of PMR. This is especially the case in Belgium, France, Greece,
Italy and Portugal where the convergence of the PMR to the German level
would have been enough to erase any real exchange-rate appreciation. The
contribution of EP is smaller but still important for France, Greece and Por-
tugal. In Ireland, convergence of both PMR and EP to German levels would
have almost doubled the observed real exchange-rate appreciation over the
period. This is because both indicators are much lower in this country than
in Germany.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed how product market regulations in nontradable sectors and
employment protection influence the dynamics of the real exchange rate. The
theoretical framework incorporates imperfect competition and employment
protection in the classical Balassa-Samuelson model. Subsequently, we have
conducted an econometric estimation for European countries over 1985-2006,
confirming the prediction of the theoretical model that product market reg-
ulations in the nontradable sector and employment protection tend to inflate
the real exchange rate. Finally, we have proposed a counter-factual exercise
to quantify further the role of product market regulations and employment
protection.
Our results confirm the role played by both types of market regulations
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in the evolution of intra-European real exchange rates. This effect is quanti-
tatively large as it explains most of observed real exchange-rate appreciation
vis-a`-vis Germany between 1995 and 2006 for several countries of the Euro
area. We conclude that structural reforms may be a powerful driver of rela-
tive price adjustment within the Euro area. Although they would not directly
impact on external competitiveness (since their influence goes through the
price of nontradables), they would raise output and labor demand in both
sectors.
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